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APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
NATURE OF THE CASE .,,.;. 
This action was filed by Appellant Commercial Building 
Corporation (here called 'Commercial1) seeking enforcement of its 
rights under a lease agreement with Respondent Frank S. Blair (here 
called 'Blair'). The acticn also sought removal of a sign and 
trailer placed upon leased property by American Savings and Loan 
Association (here called 'American') under agreement with Blair. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Prior to trial, American agreed with Commercial that 
American need not appear, but would be bound by the decision between 
Commercial and Blair. Trial was held September 15, 1975, before 
the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge, sitting without a 
jury. Judgment was entered February 4, 1976, in favor of Blair 
and against Commercial, holding in substance that Blair had no 
obligation under the lease to keep the land directly South of 
Commercial's building for parking areas only. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Commercial asks this court to reverse the Judgment and 
Decree of February 4, 1976, and direct the lower court to enter 
a Judgment prohibiting Blair from using the land directly South 
of Commercial's building for any purpose other than parking. 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS i 
Commercial Security Bank, in October of 1963, entered 
into a long term lease of certain real property located at 36th 
Street and Harrison Boulevard, Ogden, with Charlotte Skeen Blair, 
James Clifford Blair, and Frank S. Blair as Lessors. Subsequently, 
Commercial Security Bank assigned its leasehold interest to 
Commercial Building Corporation (Commercial) Plaintiff and 
Appellant herein. Also, prior to suit, Charlotte Skeen Blair and 
James Clifford Blair assigned their interests in the entire tract 
of land owned by Blairs to Frank S. Blair, (Blair) Defendant and 
Respondent. r 
The leasehold interest was acquired to construct and 
operate a bank facility, with drive-in banking facilities. A 
'plot-plan1 of the entire tract was prepared by architect Keith 
Wilcox under date of March 12, 1963 (Ex-A) and also a later one 
under date of January 21, 1964 (Ex-1). The former showed the 
bank in the Northeast quarter of the entire tract, with designated 
parking to the South of the bank all the way to 36th Street. The 
latter showed the bank in about the same location, with drive-in 
windows relocated, and did not purport to show development of the 
rest of the property owned by Blair. 
The total area when completed, was as shown on Figure 1. 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Part of Block 26, Nelson Park Addition 
N 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
1 . 18 
1 9
 t 
o ^ C 20 ^ o
 ? 
1 *fr 
| 21 1 4 6 . 7 ' S 
22 
23 
1 24 
1 M 
2 
n 
r| 
|J 
n 
1 
•1 
i 
3 
5"• | 
10,(5 ' 
36 
35 
34 
\ 33 
H 
32 
i 
f 30 
29 
28 
1 2 7 
1 26 
' 25 
/ \ 
1 \ D r i v e - I h 1 
\ /Windows 
V BANK J 
^f 
^ I 
<r 1 2 9 . 7 ' S 
N 1 
36th STREET 
Figure 1 
-3-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(This figure is illustrative only, and was not drafted to exact 
measurements.) 
The lease provisions in question provide as follows: 
"Lessor hereby leases to Lessee and Lessee hereby 
leases from Lessor the following described property in 
Weber County, State of Utah, hereinafter sometimes re-
ferred to as the "Premises," to-wit: 
PARCEL 1: All of Lots 31 to 36, both inclusive, to-
gether with the East 10.3 feet of the vacat-
ed alley adjacent on the West, Block 26, 
Nelson Park Addition in Ogden City, being 
part of the North half of Section 3 and 4, 
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
Subject to joint use with other tenants of 
Lessor of parking area, rights of way, and 
driveways other than Drive-in Window exits 
and approache s; 
PARCEL 2: Together with joint use with other tenants 
of Lessor of at least 20,000 square feet of 
additional parking area, right of way and 
driveway area located on Lots 25 to 30, in-
clusive of said Block 26, and upon property 
adjacent thereto on West." 
The question presented inthis appeal is simply what is 
Parcel 2? The area immediately South of Parcel 1, (as Commercial 
contends) or 20,000 square feet of parking located anywhere in the 
entire tract South of Parcel 1? (as Blair contends.) 
As seen from Figure 1 and Exhibit D, lots 25 through 30 
are roughly 130 x 25 each, or 130 x 6 x 25 = 19,500 square feet. 
Lot N at the South of Lots 25 to 30 was overlooked in drafting 
the lease (R-144) but was intended to be part of Parcel 2 (R-139) 
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and not a barrier to access to 36th Street (R-121) . In cal-
culations used in drafting the lease, the area South of Parcel 
1 was regarded as 168 feet North to South, or 6 lots at 25 feet, 
plus 18 feet to the South thereof to 36th Street. This amounted 
to approximately 23,500 square feet (140 x 168), (R-114). 
Prior to execution of the lease, an Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Lease had been executed between the parties on or 
about July 20, 1963 (Ex-H). This provided the same basic area 
for the bank in Parcel 1, and set out the parking as follows: 
.••"Landlord to provide additional parking not 
less than 150! x 140' adjacent on South to above 
parcel, to be completed simultaneous with sur-
facing of tenant's parcel." 
Both the Earnest Money Receipt and the Lease were drafted 
by Wallace Woodbury, who regarded himself as agent for both parties 
(R-110, 133). 
The lease was a 'net1 lease, with the costs of the bank 
and foundation being borne by Commercial in the approximate sum 
of $171,000.00 (R-71). It is a 20 year lease with two 10 year 
options. 
In addition to the provisions quoted above, the lease 
in part provided: (E 5, Alterations and Improvements.) 
"Lessee shall have the right to make any alterations 
or improvements and to install any fixtures in or upon 
-5-
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PARCEL 1 for and during the term of this lease; provided, 
however, that all improvements and uses of same shall 
comply with all applicable laws and ordinances and shall 
be in accordance with a mutually approved plot plan gen-
erally similar to that prepared by Keith Wilcox dated 
March 12, 1963. 
Lessee shall provide necessary fill and compaction, 
retaining walls, landscaping and other improvements to 
generally develop the premises in accordance with such 
mutually approved plan; provided, however, thait Lessee's 
obligation to furnish fill and improvements shall be 
limited to PARCEL 1, and adjacent approaches thereto 
from Harrison Boulevard. 
Lessor shall install asphalt surfacing and paint 
parking lines over portions of the entire premises de-
signated as parking and drive areas, and Lessee shall 
pay to Lessor a pro-rata share of the cost such that 
Lessee ultimately pays the surfacing and lining costs 
of the PARCEL 1, plus approaches thereto over public 
property to the East of PARCEL 1. 
Lessor shall complete surfacing of PARCEL jL, and 
PARCEL 2_, a/t or near the same time, such that the entire 
area will be available for use at substantially the same 
time." (Emphasis added.) 
Parcel 2 was built and constructed by Blair at the same 
time as Commercial put its improvements on Parcel 1, (R-99). This 
was in the area comprising lots 2 5 through 30, and half of the 
vacated alley, plus the additional 18 feet on the South (R-83), 
immediately South of the bank, as shown on the March 12, 1963 
plot plan, and was designated and used as parking ever since, (R-83), 
the only exception being the American trailer and sign, (R-100). 
The area to the West was never developed or used for parking or 
-6-
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anything else. In the months prior to suit being filed, Blair 
did cause some hard topping to be placed in the area of lots 19 
through 24, but this has never been used as parking. 
In 1965, the Bank became aware that Blair was contemplating 
putting improvements upon, or leasing part of the parking area South 
of Parcel 1 (R-154). Exhibit E, a letter from counsel for the bank 
to Blair was promptly sent setting out the bank's position that this 
area could not be used for any purpose other than parking. No re-
sponse from Blair was ever received (R-153). Blair testified he 
believed he told a bank officer he disagreed with their position 
(R-89); the bank officer denied such a conversation (R-153). 
In 1973, American Savings and Loan under agreement with 
Blair placed a temporary trailer facility upon the parking area 
directly South of the bank. Commercial consented to this location 
with certain conditions specified in their letter of consent (Ex-F). 
Blair testified he told the Bank he did not agree with their inter-
pretation for the first time in 1973, 10 years after execution of 
the lease (R-102). 
When American's trailer long overstayed the time frame 
set out in Exhibit F, this suit was instituted to enforce Commercial's 
claim that Parcel 2 was in the area directly South of Parcel 1. 
Since decision in this case, the trailer has been removed, but a 
-7-
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sign remains and Commercial is threatened with future building 
in that area unless the Court reverses the Trial Court's judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE LEASE 
WAS UNCLEAR AND VAGUE IN THE DESCRIPTION OF 
PARCEL 2, AND THAT THE PARTIES INTENDED PARCEL 
2 TO INCLUDE LOTS 19 THROUGH 24. 
Parcel 2 is described as, 
"•..at least 20,000 square feet of additional parking 
area, right of way and driveway area located on Lots 
2 5 to 30, inclusive of said Block 26, and upon pro-
perty adjacent thereto on West." 
The rule in Utah, as elsewhere, is that if the Lease 
agreement is not ambiguous or uncertain, the Court shall construe 
the lease simply from the four corners of the document itself. 
Security Leasing Co. v Flinco, 23 U2 242, 461 P2d 460 (1969). 
Where the parties have negotiated amd reduced their intentions 
to a writing as a complete and accurate representation of their 
understanding, other evidence will not be received to vary or 
contradict that writing. Youngren v Lloyd Const. Co., 22 U2 207, 
450 P2d 985 (1969), Rainford v Rytting, 22 U2 252, 451 P2d 769 
(1969). 
The question for this court is whether the Trial Court 
was correct in finding the description of Parcel 2 vague, and using 
• 8 -
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other evidence (i.e., testimony of Woodbury) to make a finding 
as to the actual extent of Parcel 2. 
Blair's claim, and as found by the Court, is that Parcel 
2 is at least 20,000 square feet of parking, located on lots 25 to 
30 and/or lots 19 to 24 and/or the vacated alley between. The 
question immediately arises, why did the lease not say just that? 
It would have been much easier for the expert scrivener (Woodbury, 
an attorney) to state exactly that rather than the language actually 
used. In the lease, as finally drafted, Parcel 2 is on Lots 2 5 to 
30 inclusive, and upon 
We submit the clear meaning of this language is that lots 
25 to 30 are to be parking, etc., and such other land as needed to 
the West to make up 20,000 square feet shall also be used. Any 
other interpretation puts an alternative ('or') in the description 
that does not exist in the lease. As interpreted by the Trial 
Court, the entire 20,000 square feet could be located on land other 
than Lots 25 to 30; both Blair and Woodbury testified such was 
never the intent of either party (R-148, 170). 
"And", according to common and approved usage, expresses 
the relation of addition. State v Salt Co., 34 U 458, 98 Pac 549, 
1908, rev. on other grounds 221 U.S. 451, 55 L. Ed. 810. "And" 
should not be used as a substitute for 'or1, Weir v Bauer, 75 U 
498, 286 P 936 (1930). "And" interpreted as 'in addition to1, or 
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'something added to what precedes itf , Bd, of Ed. v Wright-Osborn, 
49 U 453, 164 Pac 1033, (1912). 
The lease specifies lots 25 to 30 (less than 20,000 
feet) and then adds to that lands adjacent on the West. The land 
adjacent on the West is the vacated alley, not lots 19 to 24. The 
interpretation of the Trial Court changes 'and1 as used in the 
lease to 'or1, and is not justified by any language of the document. 
POINT II. 
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE LEASE, PARCEL 2 WAS 
FIXED WHEN BLAIR CONSTRUCTED IT UPON LANDS 
DIRECTLY SOUTH OF PARCEL 1. 
The effect of the 1964 construction by Blair of Parcel 
2 in the area directly South of the bank (Parcel 1) is really two-
fold. 
Assuming, arguendo, the description of Parcel 2 is 
vague, as found by the Trial Court, other evidence becomes admisst-
able to help the court interpret the true intent of the parties. 
The best evidence (outside the lease itself) lies in the construc-
tion put upon it by the parties themselves. Here, we know the 
parking was built in 1964 exactly where Commercial contends it 
was supposed to be; and no controversy arose between the parties 
as to where it could be located until 1973 (R-100, 102). 
Such construction of the lease, evidenced by the acts 
-lo- *"::" ' A" "• * 
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of the parties, should be given due wei ght by tl le Coiii I:» an 3 ma^ 
b e t: c > n e 1 \ i s i v o _' i i C JJ .J.S. Landlord and Tenant, I 2 32 (11). The 
parties to an instrument are in a superior position to know its 
purpose , and I: I: le :i r pi:ac 1: :i ca] cons11: i ict i on is a preferred index 
to i ts me an ing. Jarrett v Eugene Medical Center, Or. 1 °c A °°A 
P2d !J6.J. In Hinkle v Blinn, < -. • r-. - • •<•:•'< /cerpie-
tation placed upon a lease by the parties for •: no year was held 
binding ~~ *-1 * '"as^ to som^ degree si rr ; Kirs was 
JUUL ,'\cir. ___t._ t\cui„ ±?VJ i , 43 j P2d 367. I, construing an ambiguous 
;f-^ n^ leas*" * 1- court rit^d with approval <^^ m a previoi is case 
"Thus, where a vendor places hi s purchaser in 
possession of land, as here, under a certain descript-
ion in the deed, the vendor cannot afterward avail 
himself of any ambiguity in the conveyance, their 
contemporaneous construction fix ing the intent i on of 
the parties." 
:,p . . r. several pro-
visions of the lease: 
Paragraph in part): 
"Lessor shall ur t ii risplwit. surfacing and 
paint parking 1iru-^  r.v** oortions of the entire 
premises designated as parking and drive areas, 
and Lessee shall pay to Lessor a pro-rata share 
of the cost such that Lessee ultimately pays the 
surfacing arid 1 i ning cost of PARCEL, I , plus appro-
aches thereto over public property to the East of 
J
 PARCEL 1. 
-n-
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Lessor shall complete surfacing of PARCEL 1, 
and PARCEL 2, at or near the same time, such that 
the entire area will be available for use at sub-
stantially the same time." 
Paragraph 20: QUIET ENJOYMENT 
"Lessor covenants and agrees with the Lessee 
that conditioned upon Lessee's paying the rent herein 
provided and performing and fulfilling all the covenants 
agreements, conditions and provisions herein to be kept, 
observed or performed by Lessee shall and may at all 
times during the term hereby granted peaceably, quietly 
and exclusively have, hold and enjoy the dfemised premises." 
Paragraph 23: PUBLIC AREAS 
"All rights of way, driveways, parking areas, 
and other asphalt areas or sidewalks on the premises 
shall be deemed joint-use areas for use of Lessee and 
its customers and of other tenants of Lessor and their 
customers, except that Lessee reserves exclusive control 
of approaches to and exits from such drive-in windows 
as may be constructed on PARCEL 1." 
Paragraph 24: USE AND MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC AREAS 
"All public areas as above described shall be 
maintained in good, tenantable, and presentable condition 
by the respective parties in accordance with mutually 
satisfactory operating agreements providing generally 
for such maintenance and snow removal, with expenses 
shared such that Lessee pays a pro-rata share represent-
ing the proportionate cost attributable to PARCEL 1 and 
its approaches." 
We have then, a specific demise of a Parcel 2. Assuming, as Blair 
argues, Parcel 2 could be placed anywhere in the South % of his 
property, he did in fact place it directly South of Parcel 1. 
When he did so, Parcel 2 was completed and fixed and located. 
The only question then is whether at a later time, Blair has the 
-12-
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option to move Parcel *• an entirely dr i'- - ••..-,* : .r No 
such power appearb ±n LA*e lease, >i.; : r -v.-.i]..: _ _,i: dw.^'t !y 'on-
trary to the quiet enjoyment provisions of Paragraph 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT AS 
TO ALTERNATIVE LOCATIONS IS CONTRARY TO 
ALL THE EVIDENCE. 
As previously noted, under the "Trii"! rourt ' s decision 
and judgment, Blatr it I MM- . ^ - i- • ; • of 
the South h of his property. ': MI;: . h* would h^v^ t h- rich* * 
cover the existing Parcel 2 > f * *< , 1 inq^ an^ movp the par1< i 
completely to the West thereof, on Lots 19 through 24 and the 
alleyway. None of the evidence justified this m l inn. Aaain 
as sum i ng • - . • i*r * -r-irco . s as originally 
drafted, hot* Blair and the draftsman, Woodbury, testified it was 
never the ^ . ' >, 
just a limited portion thereof 'K ' 4«-, 1 ••. ' v *• . * -VTt; 
nevertheless went far beyon * • •• • j.ed 
rights in this respect
 vR-i,^ ) . 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence is without conflict that for purposes of 
vi si bility, access, parking, and commercial vnlur-, Parcel. 2 is 
• : : i t i ca.]| -•nv : . , •: ••.•-...?-.'• . * : • an ease-
-] 3-
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ment in specific real estate is a valuable right that will be 
protected and enforced, see A.L. Williams and Son v Brown, Ut. 
1956, 18 U2d 2^4, 418 P2d 981. There was no disagreement here 
for 9 years, and Parcel 2 was constructed in the area designated 
by the Lease itself. To allow the landlord to arbitrarily change 
it, after Commerical has expended extensive amounts based upon 
• ' • • - • ' " i- ','.. j, 'T. .L I .i •'•:. ""• "f' * ' " w ' i ' f " . '"• *"'. • 
their easement in its present location, is improper and the 
judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed. 
-••''"••-> > r u .
 Si,. t ; .Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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